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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
FOR THE COUNTY OF STANISLAUS

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,  
  
Plaintiff,  
  
vs.  
  
SCOTT LEE PETERSON,  
  
Defendant.

) Case No. **1056770**  
) **BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO**  
) **DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CLOSE**  
) **PRELIMINARY HEARING AND IN**  
) **SUPPORT OF RULE 980**  
) **APPLICATIONS FOR TELEVISION**  
) **COVERAGE OF THE PRELIMINARY**  
) **HEARING FILED BY COURTROOM**  
) **TELEVISION NETWORK, CABLE**  
) **NEWS NETWORK, LP LLLP,**  
) **NATIONAL BROADCASTING**  
) **COMPANY, INC., AND AMERICAN**  
) **BROADCASTING COMPANIES, INC.**  
) **[APPENDIX OF EXHIBITS A-L AND**  
) **APPENDIX OF NON-CALIFORNIA**  
) **AUTHORITIES FILED**  
) **CONCURRENTLY.]**  
)  
) Hearing Date: August 14, 2003  
) Time: 8:30 a.m.  
) Department: 2

FILED  
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CLERK OF THE SUPERIOR COURT  
COUNTY OF STANISLAUS  
BY Amity Davis DEPUTY

1 Non-party media organizations Courtroom Television Network ("Court TV"),<sup>1</sup> Cable News  
2 Network LP, LLLP ("CNN"),<sup>2</sup> National Broadcasting Company, Inc. ("NBC"),<sup>3</sup> and American  
3 Broadcasting Companies, Inc. ("ABC")<sup>4</sup> (collectively "Access Proponents") respectfully submit the  
4 following memorandum in support of their applications under California Rule of Court 980 for  
5 television coverage of the preliminary hearing in this matter, and in opposition to Defendant's  
6 Motion to Close Preliminary Hearing.<sup>5</sup>

7 DATED: July 31, 2003

8 DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP  
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14 Attorneys for Non-Party Media Organizations  
15 Courtroom Television Network, Cable News  
16 Network LP, LLLP, National Broadcasting  
17 Company, Inc., and American Broadcasting  
18 Companies, Inc.

19 <sup>1</sup> Court TV is a national cable television network, dedicated to reporting on the legal and  
20 judicial systems of the United States, the 50 states, and the District of Columbia. Since its creation  
21 in 1991, Court TV's cornerstone has been to televise civil and criminal trials, and it has televised  
22 more than 800 trials and other legal proceedings.

23 <sup>2</sup> CNN is the world's largest news organization with over a dozen television and radio news  
24 networks and websites, as well as several news programming services, produced and distributed  
25 domestically and worldwide.

26 <sup>3</sup> NBC produces and distributes news programming through broadcast television, cable  
27 television, the internet, and other distribution channels.

28 <sup>4</sup> ABC, through its subsidiaries, owns and operates ABC News, the ABC Radio Network,  
and local broadcast television and radio stations that gather and report news to the public.

<sup>5</sup> Court TV's 980 application was filed and served on May 27, 2003, and a copy is attached  
to the concurrently filed Appendix ("App.") as Tab A. The 980 applications by CNN, NBC, and  
ABC are being filed and served concurrently, and copies are included in the Appendix collectively  
as Tab B.

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**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

**1.**  
**INTRODUCTION**

In 1986, the United States Supreme Court held that the First Amendment guarantees the public a presumptive right to attend preliminary hearings in criminal cases. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (“Press-Enterprise II”), 478 U.S. 1, 10 (1986). Because openness is so fundamental to the U.S. criminal justice system, a court may close a preliminary hearing only under the most extraordinary circumstances. As one judge noted in rejecting a motion to close the preliminary hearing in the Polly Klaas murder trial, “[t]his Court knows of ... no reported case in the State of California since [Press-Enterprise II was decided in] 1986 where a California preliminary hearing has been successfully closed.” California v. Davis, 22 Media L. Rptr. 2465, 2466 (Cal. Municipal Ct.), aff’d, 22 Media L. Rptr. 2466, 2467-68 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1994). This is true notwithstanding the fact that California has experienced numerous high-profile trials in the last two decades, including the trials of O.J. Simpson, the Menendez brothers, and the Rodney King beating trial, among others. Nothing contained in defendant Scott Peterson’s brief comes close to overcoming the high burden necessary to justify closure of the preliminary hearing in this case.

This Court also should permit the hearing to be televised. This case already has garnered extensive media coverage, and will continue to do so regardless of whether electronic access to the court is permitted. But the defendant’s fair trial rights and the public’s access rights will best be served if the focus is on the evidence actually presented in court, and not on rumors or speculation circulating outside the courtroom. Any attempt to limit access to information about the actual proceedings inevitably will result in the wide dissemination of inaccuracies, as gossip and rumor take the place of fact. This Court can ensure that accurate information about what actually happens within the confines of the courtroom is available, by permitting television coverage of the proceedings, as has been done successfully during the pendency of this case.<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup> As this Court knows from prior experience, the presence of a television camera in the courtroom is not disruptive. Before each proceeding, Access Proponents work with the Court and court personnel to ensure that all requirements concerning equipment placement and camera coverage are satisfied. In accordance with Rule 980’s “pool” requirements, they would employ a single stationary camera, which produces no noise and requires no enhanced lighting.

**DEFENDANT HAS NOT COME CLOSE TO SATISFYING THE STRINGENT BURDENS  
REQUIRED TO JUSTIFY CLOSURE OF THE PRELIMINARY HEARING.**

In response to requests for televised coverage of the preliminary hearing, defendant has asked that the entire hearing be closed to the public and press. Because he has not satisfied any of the constitutional hurdles for this extraordinary result, his motion must be denied.<sup>7</sup>

**A. The Preliminary Hearing Must Be Open Absent Compelling Reasons, Supported By Specific, On-The-Record Findings.**

The First Amendment mandates that preliminary hearings, like criminal trials, be open to the press and the public, absent compelling and clearly articulated reasons for closure. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 & n.17 (1980); NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 4th 1178, 1206 (1999) (quoting Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 12-14.) Closure is constitutionally prohibited unless there is a clear showing that: (1) an overriding interest supports closure; (2) a substantial probability exists that the interest will be prejudiced absent closure; (3) closure is narrowly tailored to serve the overriding interest; and (4) no less restrictive means exist to achieve that interest. NBC Subsidiary, 20 Cal. 4th at 1218-19.<sup>8</sup> As the California Supreme Court has noted, access to preliminary hearings “plays a particularly significant positive role in the actual functioning of the process” because the preliminary hearing is “often the final and most important step in the criminal proceeding.” Id. at 1206.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>7</sup> The remarkably thin showing offered by defendant for this highly unusual motion suggests that it has been presented largely as a ploy to avoid television access to the preliminary hearing, by creating the false suggestion that allowing public access without televised coverage is a “middle ground.” Access Proponents urge the Court to reject this baseless motion, and to evaluate the Rule 980 applications on their merits.

<sup>8</sup> See also Associated Press v. District Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1983) (public’s right of access in criminal proceeding can be overcome only by an affirmative showing that closure is “strictly and inescapably necessary” to promote a competing interest of the highest order) (emphasis added); Estate of Hearst, 67 Cal. App. 3d 777, 785 (1977) (sealing orders can be justified only in “exceptional” circumstances where sealing is necessary to promote a “compelling” interest; Hearst family’s claim that disclosure of sealed court documents would put their family, including minor children, in physical danger, was insufficient to justify blanket sealing orders).

<sup>9</sup> An independent right of access to preliminary hearings exists under the California Constitution, see, e.g., Copley Press v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. App. 4th 106, 111 (1992), and under California Penal Code § 868.

1 Critically, it is the party advocating closure that bears the burden of demonstrating the  
2 exceptional circumstances that justify such an extraordinary remedy. See, e.g., Mary R. v. B. & R.  
3 Corp., 149 Cal. App. 3d 308, 317 (1983) (“the burden rests on the party seeking to deny public  
4 access ... to establish compelling reasons why and to what extent [court] records should be made  
5 private”); Estate of Hearst, 67 Cal. App. 3d at 785 (same). Defendant has not met this high burden.

6 **B. Defendant Has Not And Cannot Justify The Extreme Closure Order He Requests.**

7 Defendant’s primary ground for advocating the extraordinary remedy of closing the  
8 preliminary hearing is the allegation that there might be prejudicial evidence admitted that would  
9 be publicized before the trial. This concern, no different in this case from any other case, cannot  
10 justify closure. The United States Supreme Court addressed this precise issue in Press-Enterprise  
11 II, noting that “[t]he First Amendment right of access cannot be overcome by the conclusory  
12 assertion that publicity might deprive the defendant of [the right to a fair trial],” even though the  
13 public might be exposed to information that could be deemed inadmissible at trial. 478 U.S. at 15.  
14 Instead, the party advocating closure of a preliminary hearing must affirmatively show that, absent  
15 closure, there is a substantial probability that a defendant’s fair trial interests will be prejudiced. Id.  
16 at 9. “Substantial probability” is a high hurdle, and it is not sufficient to show simply a “reasonable  
17 likelihood” of prejudice. Id.

18 Courts routinely have rejected pretrial publicity as a basis for denying the public’s right of  
19 access to court proceedings and documents. As the Supreme Court noted more than thirty years  
20 ago, in any “important case,”

21 scarcely any of those best qualified to serve as jurors will not have formed some impression  
22 or opinion as to the merits of the case. To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived  
23 notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the  
24 presumption of a prospective juror’s impartiality would be to establish an impossible  
25 standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a  
26 verdict based on the evidence presented in court.

27 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1961) (citations omitted). When faced squarely with the  
28 issue, the United States Supreme Court emphasized that “pretrial publicity – even pervasive,  
adverse publicity – does not inevitably lead to an unfair trial.” Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427  
U.S. 539, 554 (1976) (emphasis added). On the contrary, the Court noted that “[i]n the



1 | overwhelming majority of criminal trials, pretrial publicity presents few unmanageable threats to  
2 | the rights of the accused.” Id. at 551. The Court reached the same conclusion in the context of gag  
3 | orders, finding that “[e]mpirical research suggests that in the few cases when jurors have been  
4 | exposed to extensive and prejudicial publicity, they are able to disregard it and base their verdict on  
5 | the evidence presented in court. ...” Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1053 (1991).

6 | The United States Supreme Court’s skepticism concerning the prejudicial impact of pretrial  
7 | publicity is shared by lower courts. In the high-profile drug prosecution of John DeLorean, for  
8 | example, the Ninth Circuit held that “[w]idespread publicity ... does not necessarily lead to an  
9 | unfair trial.” CBS, Inc. v. District Court, 729 F.2d 1174, 1179 (9th Cir. 1984) (“CBS I”). Despite  
10 | the “enormous, incessant, and continually increasing publicity,” the court rejected the defendant’s  
11 | arguments that the dissemination of government videotapes purporting to show him engaging in  
12 | narcotics trafficking would compromise his right to a fair trial. Id. As the court explained:

13 | Recent highly publicized cases indicate that even when exposed to heavy and  
14 | widespread publicity many, if not most, potential jurors are untainted by press  
15 | coverage. In one of the recent Abscam prosecutions, the court found that, despite  
16 | concentrated media coverage, “only one-half of the prospective jurors indicated  
17 | that they had ever heard of Abscam ... and [of those] only eight or ten had  
18 | ‘anything more than a most generalized kind of recollection what it was all  
19 | about.’ ... Similarly, in one of the Watergate prosecutions, the District of  
20 | Columbia Circuit stated that, despite perhaps the most pervasive publicity  
21 | accorded any trial in American history, “without undue effort, it would be  
22 | possible to empanel a jury whose members had never even heard the [Watergate]  
23 | tapes.”

19 | Id. at 1179-80 (citations omitted).

20 | California state courts have reached the same conclusion. In People v. Manson, 61 Cal.  
21 | App. 3d 102, 187-91 (1976), the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that widespread pretrial  
22 | publicity about Charles Manson and his followers’ notorious killing spree, which dwarfed anything  
23 | in the present case, prejudiced the defendants’ right to a fair trial. Similarly, in Press-Enterprise v.  
24 | Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 4th 498, 503 (1994), the Court of Appeal reversed a trial court’s order  
25 | sealing portions of the grand jury transcript in a high-profile murder case, finding that the defendant  
26 | had not satisfied the strict requirements for demonstrating prejudice to his Sixth Amendment rights.  
27 | “Even accepting the trial court’s finding that prospective jurors reading newspaper accounts of the  
28 | grand jury transcripts are likely to remember these reports and may even develop a preconception”

1 concerning the defendant's "guilt or innocence," the court held that it could not "conclude that  
2 release of this material would make it difficult to find 12 jurors capable of acting impartially." *Id.*

3 Defendant's submission does not come close to satisfying his heavy burden. His primary  
4 argument appears to be based on the fact that that this Court already has taken steps to alleviate any  
5 potentially prejudicial pre-trial publicity in this case. (Motion at 3-4, 7.) But defendant's attempt  
6 to shoehorn the Court's imposition of a gag order into justifying closure of the entire preliminary  
7 hearing ignores the fact that a completely different standard applies to gag orders than must be  
8 applied to closure orders. As defendant's criminal counsel is aware, under Younger v. Smith, 30  
9 Cal. App. 3d 138 (1973), the Court was required only to find a "reasonable likelihood of prejudicial  
10 news which would make difficult the impaneling of an impartial jury and tend to prevent a fair  
11 trial." (Order at 3 (emphasis added).) This is far different than the test for closure, which requires  
12 a "substantial probability" of prejudice that could not be alleviated by alternative means.<sup>10</sup>

13 Moreover, in entering its protective order this Court expressed concern with "the rumors  
14 and gossip" that it feared "would be rehashed shortly before trial ...." (*Id.*) That concern is not  
15 raised by public access to the actual court proceedings, which ensures that accurate information  
16 about what has transpired is available.<sup>11</sup>

17 Defendant also asserts that the prosecution will offer false evidence at the preliminary  
18 hearing, but provides no facts to support this self-serving claim. General statements by the District  
19

20  
21 <sup>10</sup> Ironically, as this Court has recognized, "Defense Counsel was a regular commentator  
22 prior to the Defendant's arrest and his being retained on the case. Also, Second Counsel gave a  
23 lengthy televised interview prior to the arrest." (June 10 Order at 1; see also App. Tab L.)  
24 Defendant also invited publicity in the past, quickly calling on the press for help after his wife  
25 disappeared. (App. Tab L.) Defendant and his counsel should not be permitted to pursue publicity  
26 only when it suits their interests, and attempt to bar access to information about what actually  
27 happens before the Court.

28 <sup>11</sup> This distinction was noted by the Fifth Appellate District in its decision issued in this case  
on June 30, 2003. Access Proponents strongly disagree with the skepticism expressed by the Court  
of Appeal about the difficulty of obtaining an "untainted" jury if the search warrant materials at  
issue were released (Op. at 7); such skepticism is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's explicit  
findings in the cases cited above, as well as anecdotal experience in numerous high-publicity  
criminal trials. But even the Court of Appeal's decision yesterday recognized that a different  
standard applies during the preliminary hearing, and that even release of the same information  
under the control of the parties and the trial court would not generate the same concerns. (Op. at 8.)

1 Attorney that the preliminary hearing will “open some eyes” say nothing about the evidence they  
2 intend to offer, and provide no basis for defense counsel’s assertion that what is presented will be  
3 false. (Motion at 4.) Nor can defendant’s complaint about discovery conceivably give rise to the  
4 specific, on-the-record findings the Court must enter to justify closure. (Motion at 5.) If  
5 defendant’s counsel is concerned about the discovery from the prosecution, the remedy is not to  
6 close the preliminary hearing; instead, if a sufficient showing is made, the Court can enter the  
7 Orders necessary to ensure that defendant gets discovery in time to prepare for the hearing, or move  
8 the hearing date. Both of these are reasonable alternatives to closure, and are less restrictive means  
9 of protecting defendant’s rights as required by the First Amendment.

10 Finally, defendant claims that the ongoing search for the “true killer” of Laci Peterson and  
11 her unborn child will be impeded if the public gets access to the exculpatory evidence defense  
12 counsel intends to offer at the preliminary hearing. Even assuming that this conjectural assertion  
13 has any validity, it militates against closure. As discussed above, access to preliminary hearings is  
14 particularly important because it is “often the final and most important step in the criminal  
15 proceeding.” NBC Subsidiary, 20 Cal. 4th at 1206. If this may be the last hearing in this case, the  
16 public is entitled to complete information about what has transpired. Moreover, defendant’s fair  
17 trial rights would only be furthered by public exposure to such exculpatory evidence.<sup>12</sup>

18 Ultimately, the concerns expressed by defendant can be resolved through alternative to  
19 closure, including voir dire, admonitions, instructions, and other tools. In Press-Enterprise II, the  
20 United States Supreme Court held that “[t]hrough voir dire, cumbersome as it is in some  
21 circumstances, a court can identify those jurors whose prior knowledge of the case would disable  
22 them from rendering an impartial verdict.” 478 U.S. at 15. Likewise, in NBC Subsidiary, the  
23 California Supreme Court rejected arguments that admonitions and instructions were insufficient to  
24 secure a fair trial in a celebrity case involving “intense and pervasive media coverage.” 20 Cal. 4th  
25

26 <sup>12</sup> In any event, if there was a basis for keeping some particular piece of evidence or  
27 testimony from public view temporarily, that does not justify closure of the entire preliminary  
28 hearing. The constitutional requirement that closure orders be “narrowly drawn” mandates that  
only the portion of the hearing for which sufficient justification can be shown – if any – be closed.  
Press Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 15.

1 at 1223. As the Court noted, “frequent and specific admonitions and instructions, coupled with  
2 careful voir dire of the jurors,” is sufficient in virtually every case. Id. at 1224. This Court is more  
3 than capable of taking the necessary steps to ensure that defendant receives a fair trial. Sacrificing  
4 the public’s right of access is neither necessary nor permissible. Because defendant has not and  
5 cannot demonstrate that this case presents extraordinary circumstances – circumstances that did not  
6 exist in cases receiving far more publicity than this case, including the trials of O.J. Simpson, the  
7 Manson family, and John DeLorean, among others – his closure request should be rejected.

8  
9 **3.**  
**PUBLIC POLICY STRONGLY SUPPORTS TELEVISION COVERAGE**  
**OF THE PRELIMINARY HEARING.**

10 The presence of cameras in the courtroom confers numerous benefits on the public. In  
11 addition to the empirical data refuting the “parade of horrors” claimed by the prosecution to result  
12 from the presence of cameras, the Court must consider the competing public interest in obtaining  
13 comprehensive, contemporaneous electronic coverage of judicial proceedings.

14 As described above, it is a matter of federal constitutional law that the public has a right of  
15 access to criminal proceedings, which historically has been considered vital not only to protect the  
16 rights of the parties, but also to increase public confidence in the eventual result. As the United  
17 States Supreme Court recognized in Press-Enterprise II, “[t]he value of openness lies in the fact that  
18 people not actually attending trials can have confidence that standards of fairness are being  
19 observed; the sure knowledge that anyone is free to attend gives assurance that established  
20 procedures are being followed and that deviations will become known[.]” 478 U.S. at 13 (quoting  
21 Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court (“Press-Enterprise I”), 464 U.S. 501 (1984)).

22 The media – and, in particular, television – play an indispensable role in informing the  
23 public about the conduct of judicial proceedings. In Richmond Newspapers, the United States  
24 Supreme Court noted that “[i]nstead of acquiring information about trials by first hand observation  
25 or by word of mouth from those who attend, people now acquire it chiefly through the print and  
26 electronic media.” 448 U.S. at 573. “In a sense,” the Court explained, this development “validates  
27 the media claim of functioning as surrogates for the public. ... [Media representatives] often are  
28 provided special seating and priority of entry so that they may report what people in attendance

1 have seen and heard. This ‘contribute[s] to public understanding of the rule of law and to  
2 comprehension of the functioning of the entire judicial system ....’” Id. at 573 (quoting Nebraska  
3 Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment)).

4 In cases such as this one, which has generated significant public interest, the public’s right  
5 of access is devalued unless the media is allowed to function as a surrogate. While newspapers can  
6 provide descriptive coverage of court proceedings, they cannot show the public exactly what  
7 happens in the courtroom, and physical limits restrict the availability of seats in the courtroom for  
8 all interested spectators. “In advancing the [] purposes [of open judicial proceedings], the  
9 availability of a trial transcript is no substitute for a public presence at the trial itself. As any  
10 experienced appellate judge can attest, the “cold” record is a very imperfect reproduction of events  
11 that transpire in the courtroom.” Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 597 n.22 (Marshall, J. and  
12 Brennan, J. concurring) (emphasis added). To enable the media to perform its surrogate function  
13 most effectively, the maximum amount of information must be available to the public. The most  
14 effective means of making that information available in its most accurate, objective form is through  
15 cameras.

16 The fact that this is a highly-publicized case does not provide any basis for restricting public  
17 access by barring camera coverage. To the contrary, regardless of whether cameras are permitted  
18 in the courtroom, the preliminary hearing will be widely discussed and commented upon. As the  
19 Florida Supreme Court observed, “newsworthy trials are newsworthy trials, and ... they will be  
20 extensively covered by the media both within and without the courtroom,” whether or not cameras  
21 are permitted. In re Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations, Inc., 370 So. 2d 768, 776 (Fla. 1979).  
22 Indeed, this Court already has recognized and enunciated the importance of television coverage of  
23 courtroom events. Permitting cameras to observe what actually takes place, as this Court has  
24 recognized, “foster(s) accuracy in reporting ....” (June 12, Minute Order, App. Tab E at 2.)  
25 Quoting the United States Supreme Court in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 359 (1966), this  
26 Court explained that it is the disclosure of inaccurate information which “lead[s] to groundless  
27 rumors and confusion.” (App. Tab E at 2; see also id. at 3.)

28 Without cameras in the courtroom, information about what happens during the preliminary

1 hearing will come from the few members of the public and press able to fit inside the courtroom, or  
2 from individuals speculating about what has occurred. (App. Tab F.) Without cameras, it is more  
3 likely that commentators will offer only abbreviated summaries of the evidence offered or “sound  
4 bites” from out-of-court interviews, perhaps juxtaposed against out-of-court photographs of  
5 participants. Without cameras, citizens will judge the proceedings with whatever information they  
6 possess, however truncated, salacious, or inaccurate. Thus, as a practical matter, allowing cameras  
7 in newsworthy trials reduces speculation about the proceedings, and decreases inaccuracies.<sup>13</sup>

8 The question raised by Access Proponents’ applications, then, is not whether the  
9 preliminary hearing will generate public attention and interest. The question is whether public  
10 information about the preliminary hearing is to come solely from second-hand summaries of the  
11 news, or whether the public will be permitted to observe the actual in-court proceedings – dignified,  
12 somber, and under the firm control of this Court. The latter is not only appropriate under Rule 980,  
13 but better serves the public interest. As Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy told Congress:

14 You can make the argument that the most rational, the most dispassionate, the most  
15 orderly presentation of the issue is in the courtroom, and it is the outside coverage  
16 that is really the problem. In a way, it seems perverse to exclude television from the  
17 area in which the most orderly presentation of the evidence takes place.

18 Hearings Before Subcomm. of House Comm. on Approp., 104th Congress, 2d Sess. 30 (1996).

#### 19 4.

### 20 **THE COURT SHOULD PERMIT TELEVISION COVERAGE** 21 **OF THE PRELIMINARY HEARING UNDER CALIFORNIA RULE OF COURT 980.**

22 California long has recognized the importance of allowing television coverage of trials. As  
23 early as 1967, long before technological advances permitted the unobtrusive recording of court  
24 proceedings, a California State Assembly committee emphasized that cameras in the courtroom are  
25 wholly consistent with our tradition of public trials. Because “sprawling urbanism has replaced

26 <sup>13</sup> This is particularly true in light of the broad Protective Order issued by the Court on June  
27 12, 2003. Pursuant to that Order, the parties involved may only discuss “[t]he scheduling and result  
28 of any stage of the pretrial proceedings held in open court in an open or public session.” (App. Tab  
E at 5.) The Order prohibits them from discussing the substance of any such proceedings, to  
counter any inaccurate information that might otherwise be publicly disseminated. As discussed  
above, defendant’s suggestion that the entire proceeding be closed only magnifies this problem, as  
everything about the proceeding becomes the subject of speculation, rumor, and leaks.

1 concentrated ruralism,” and because “no courtroom in the land could hold even a minute fraction of  
2 the people interested in specific cases,” the committee concluded that “a trial is not truly public  
3 unless news media are free to bring it to the home of the citizens by newspaper, magazine, radio,  
4 television or whatever device they have.”<sup>14</sup> In 1981, California adopted Rule 980, which permits  
5 television coverage of criminal and civil trials.

6 Fifteen years later, after the O.J. Simpson criminal trial, the Chief Justice of the California  
7 Supreme Court appointed a special task force to evaluate whether television coverage of trials  
8 should be continued.<sup>15</sup> The task force solicited the views of judges, media representatives, victims’  
9 rights groups, public defenders, prosecutors, and other representatives of the bar, and analyzed  
10 other states’ experiences with television coverage of trials. Based on all the evidence that it  
11 gathered, the task force concluded that cameras should remain in California courtrooms.

12 Strikingly, the task force found that judges who actually had presided over televised trials  
13 favored allowing cameras in the courtroom. Ninety-six percent of those judges reported that the  
14 presence of a video camera did not affect the outcome of a trial or hearing in any way. In addition,  
15 the overwhelming majority of them reported that the camera did not affect their ability to maintain  
16 control of the proceedings, nor did it diminish jurors’ willingness to serve. The Judicial Council  
17 subsequently adopted nearly all of the task force’s findings, and revised Rule 980. In its current  
18 form, the Rule instructs courts to consider eighteen factors in deciding whether to permit television  
19 access. Each of the relevant factors supports television coverage of this important hearing.

20 **“(i) Importance Of Maintaining Public Trust And Confidence In The Judicial**  
21 **System.”** This factor unquestionably supports permitting television access. Members of the public  
22 can feel confident that proceedings are fair – and that the parties are adequately and fairly  
23 performing their roles in that prosecution – by seeing for themselves how and what evidence is  
24 presented. Indeed, the underlying purposes behind the constitutional right to attend and observe

25 \_\_\_\_\_  
26 <sup>14</sup> Final Report Of The Subcommittee On Free Press – Fair Trial, Assembly Interim  
27 Committee On Judiciary, January 5, 1967 (emphasis added) (App. Tab C at 9.)

28 <sup>15</sup> See 1996 Report of Task Force on Photographing, Recording, and Broadcasting in the  
Courtroom (App. Tab D at 8.)

1 criminal proceedings are furthered by permitting electronic coverage of court proceedings. As  
2 Justice Brennan observed in describing the importance of public observation of court proceedings:

3 Secrecy of judicial action can only breed ignorance and distrust of courts and  
4 suspicion concerning the competence and impartiality of judges; free and robust  
5 reporting, criticism, and debate can contribute to public understanding of the rule of  
6 law and to comprehension of the functioning of the entire criminal justice system, as  
7 well as improve the quality of that system by subjecting it to the cleansing effects of  
8 exposure and public accountability.

9 Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring).

10 A few years later, in Richmond Newspapers, the Court explained further:

11 The crucial prophylactic aspects of the administration of justice cannot function in  
12 the dark; no community catharsis can occur if justice is 'done in a corner [or] in any  
13 covert manner.' ... A result considered untoward may undermine public confidence,  
14 and where the trial has been concealed from public view an unexpected outcome can  
15 cause a reaction that the system at best has failed and at worst has been corrupted.  
16 To work effectively, it is important that society's criminal process 'satisfy the  
17 appearance of justice,' ... and the appearance of justice can best be provided by  
18 allowing people to observe it.

19 448 U.S. at 571 (emphasis added; citations omitted). "People in an open society do not demand  
20 infallibility from their institutions," the Court stated, "but it is difficult for them to accept what they  
21 are prohibited from observing." Id. at 572 (emphasis added). The Court was not concerned with  
22 whether the "right to attend criminal trials to hear, see and communicate observations concerning  
23 them" is "a 'right of access' or a 'right to gather information.'" Id. at 576. What mattered was that  
24 the right of access "would lose much meaning if access to observe the trial could ... be foreclosed  
25 arbitrarily." Id. at 576-77 (emphasis added).

26 The District Attorney's contrary argument concerning this factor is mere rhetoric. As  
27 discussed below, studies and anecdotal evidence demonstrate that television coverage does not  
28 adversely affect the trial participants. Furthermore, the suggestion that anything on television is  
purely "entertainment" is remarkably misguided; studies show that the public overwhelmingly gets  
most of its news coverage from television, rather than from the print media, making it essential that  
there is complete, accurate information for such news reporting.

29 **"(ii) Importance Of Promoting Public Access To The Judicial System."** This factor also  
30 overwhelmingly supports television access to the preliminary hearing. The courtroom can only  
31 accommodate a few dozen spectators. (Appendix Tab F.) The public – particularly the citizens of



1 Stanislaus County – will have no meaningful access to this proceeding if they cannot watch it on  
2 television. Members of the public have shown a great deal of interest in this case from the outset,  
3 responding in force to pleas for help from the Peterson family, and joining the family in grieving  
4 the death of Mrs. Peterson and her unborn child. They need and deserve to understand what  
5 happened, and should be entitled to see for themselves whether there is evidence to support the  
6 District Attorney’s murder charges against defendant.

7 The District Attorney refers dismissively to the public’s interest in the case, commenting  
8 that “courtrooms are not constructed as coliseums,” as if this was intended to limit the number of  
9 people who are able to view events in the courtroom. (DA Brief at 6.) This is specious.<sup>16</sup> As the  
10 California State Assembly emphasized in 1967, it is important to permit those interested to have  
11 access to courtroom events. If it was the intent of California’s governing bodies that public access  
12 be limited only to the few people who can physically sit in a courtroom, Rule 980 would not exist.

13 **“(iii) Parties’ Support Of Or Opposition To The Request.”** The parties’ position  
14 regarding television coverage is only one of eighteen factors for the Court to consider. Indeed,  
15 during the experimental phase of Rule 980, the Rule was amended to remove a requirement that the  
16 parties consent to allow cameras in the courtroom. One reason not to allow either side to veto  
17 camera coverage is the “community therapeutic value” of openness, recognized by the Supreme  
18 Court in the cases discussed above. For those who prefer not to view the preliminary hearing, they  
19 can exercise their right not to watch it.<sup>17</sup> But just as the Judicial Council wisely chose not to allow  
20 the parties to veto the public’s right of access, this Court should not view the parties’ opposition to  
21 camera coverage to be dispositive here.

22  
23  
24 <sup>16</sup> As the Supreme Court recognized in Press-Enterprise II, the government traditionally has  
25 attempted to accommodate the public’s desire to attend trial proceedings. For example, the  
26 probable-cause hearing in the Aaron Burr trial “was held in the Hall of the House of Delegates in  
27 Virginia, the courtroom being too small to accommodate the crush of interested citizens.” 478 U.S.  
28 at 10. Technology affords a much easier way to provide access to members of the public who are  
interested in following this proceeding.

<sup>17</sup> The suggestion that the preliminary hearing will be broadcast repeatedly also is  
unsupported. The experience of Access Proponents with virtually all similar televised hearings is  
that coverage is focused around the actual event, and is not the subject of repeated rebroadcasts.

1           “(iv) **The Nature Of The Case.**” This factor strongly supports television coverage. The  
2 police, Mrs. Peterson’s family, and defendant asked the public for help after Mrs. Peterson  
3 disappeared. They sought and received national publicity in the hope that it would help find the  
4 missing woman. When the bodies of Mrs. Peterson and her unborn child were found, the nation  
5 grieved. To ask for the public’s interest and involvement in the search, and then disregard the  
6 public’s ongoing interest in the result of criminal proceedings, is cavalier. This nature of the case  
7 heavily supports Access Proponents’ position.

8           “(v) **Privacy Rights Of All Participants In The Proceeding, Including Witnesses,**  
9 **Jurors, And Victims.**” This factor does not weigh against television coverage. Empirical  
10 evidence demonstrates that television coverage has no adverse effect on witnesses, jurors, victims  
11 or other trial participants. (See Section xix below.) The fact that the trial participants did not  
12 choose “to be in the public eye” is not the dispositive factor. The same could be said of virtually  
13 every criminal trial, yet Rule 980 does not draw such a distinction. Criminal proceedings are public  
14 events, and there is nothing about this particular case, or the preliminary hearing, that involves any  
15 extraordinary interest in privacy.<sup>18</sup> The victims here are deceased, and there are no juror issues to  
16 consider in the preliminary hearing. There is no showing that any witnesses will be adversely  
17 affected by televised coverage, and if such a showing is made about a particular witness, the Court  
18 can issue an appropriate limiting order on coverage of that individual’s testimony. Consequently,  
19 this factor provides no basis for denying camera access.

20           “(vii) **Effect On The Parties’ Ability To Select A Fair And Unbiased Jury.**” There are  
21 no grounds for any concern that television coverage in this case would negatively impact these  
22 proceedings, prejudice the defendant, or adversely impact the potential jury pool. To the contrary,  
23 as this Court previously recognized, it is the absence of television coverage that potentially poses  
24 the greatest threat to defendant’s rights. (App. Tab E.) The preliminary hearing inevitably will  
25 receive publicity with or without television coverage. This Court can best protect Defendant’s  
26

27           <sup>18</sup> This factor was intended primarily to address matters involving crimes against or  
28 involving children, sexual assault, or similar crimes, where the victim or other witnesses might be  
forced to describe embarrassing and private details about the crime.

1 rights – and ensure that the public has ready access to the fair and unbiased presentation of the  
2 evidence that will occur under this Court’s control – by permitting television coverage of the  
3 preliminary hearing.<sup>19</sup>

4 “(viii) **Effect On Any Ongoing Law Enforcement Activity In The Case.**” This Court  
5 should reject the vague and unsupported claims made regarding this factor. No ongoing law  
6 enforcement activity has been identified that would be impacted by televised coverage of what is  
7 otherwise presumptively a public court proceeding. Any genuine concern about undercover  
8 officers can easily be resolved by a limiting order that prevents video of their faces, or requires  
9 their identities to be masked. This factor should not affect the Court’s decision.

10 “(x) **Effect On Any Subsequent Proceedings In The Case.**” This factor also supports  
11 television coverage of the preliminary hearing. The assertion that cameras mean more coverage  
12 (DA Brief at 8), is purely speculative; but it is indisputable that televised access results in more  
13 accurate coverage. If this case goes to trial in Stanislaus County, anyone in the County who  
14 regularly watches television, and thus would be likely to watch the preliminary hearing,  
15 undoubtedly has seen extensive television coverage on this case, including information that may or  
16 may not have been accurate. In contrast, at the preliminary hearing, the Court will have control  
17 over the evidence presented. This result does not negatively impact the defendant’s fair trial rights,  
18 and actually has the opposite effect.

19 “(xi) **Effect Of Coverage On The Willingness Of Witnesses To Cooperate, Including**  
20 **The Risk That Coverage Will Engender Threats To The Health Or Safety Of Any Witness.**”

21 The District Attorney’s claim that television coverage of the preliminary hearing will pose a threat  
22 to any witness also is wholly unsupported.<sup>20</sup> Although the District Attorney refers generally to  
23

24  
25 <sup>19</sup> The District Attorney’s bald assertion that “[i]t is a given fact, in this modern, media-  
26 driven age, that a news story without video will receive less ‘air time’ than a similar story with a  
27 video” is unsupported and irrelevant. (DA Brief at 7.) This case already has had, and will continue  
to receive, publicity regardless of this Court’s decision about television access. No showing has or  
can be made that mere quantity of coverage prevents the selection of impartial jurors, or the  
conduct of a fair trial.

28 <sup>20</sup> Assuming that the reports of possible threats to the defendant are true, they are are  
irrelevant. There is no evidence that any witness – or any other person at all – has been threatened.

1 | claims about letters from “mentally unstable” persons, there is no link between these letters and  
2 | television coverage of what has happened in the courtroom. Nor does the District Attorney suggest  
3 | that any prospective witnesses are concerned – or have reason to be – about the effect that  
4 | television coverage may have on their health or safety. Consequently, this factor also does not  
5 | justify restricting televised coverage of the trial.

6 |       **“(xii) Effect On Excluded Witnesses Who Would Have Access To The Televised**  
7 | **Testimony Of Prior Witnesses.”** This factor also should not affect the Court’s decision. The  
8 | parties estimate that the preliminary hearing will take only a few days. It will be little burden on  
9 | excluded witnesses to avoid television coverage of the preliminary hearing during that time. The  
10 | District Attorney’s claim that “[t]his admonishment becomes completely unworkable and  
11 | unenforceable with cameras in the courtroom” has no basis in fact, and is inconsistent with the  
12 | presumption that witnesses – like jurors – will follow the admonishment of the Court.

13 |       **“(xv) Security And Dignity Of The Court.”** Television coverage has no adverse effect  
14 | on the security and dignity of the Court. To the contrary, it has furthered these important concerns  
15 | by presenting information to the public in the controlled setting of the courtroom.

16 |       **“(xviii) Maintaining Orderly Conduct Of The Proceeding.”** This factor also supports  
17 | television access. The presence of a single camera in the courtroom has not caused any disruption  
18 | in these proceedings. Although the parties at one time were concerned about the placement of the  
19 | microphones, their concern has proven unfounded. The microphones have not captured any private  
20 | or privileged conversation, and Access Proponents will work to ensure that this remains true.  
21 | Moreover, the District Attorney’s skepticism about the trustworthiness of the media also is  
22 | unfounded. The media have broadcast every hearing in this matter and there have not been any  
23 | significant problems. Access Proponents have proven here and in the countless other trials they  
24 | have covered that they will adhere to this Court’s Rules.<sup>21</sup>

25 | \_\_\_\_\_  
26 | In addition, the District Attorney does not and cannot provide any link between the purported  
27 | threats against the defendant and television coverage of any court proceedings in this case.

28 |       <sup>21</sup> For example, in the recent preliminary hearing in the Robert Blake matter, Los Angeles  
Superior Court Judge Lloyd M. Nash initially was extremely hesitant to permit cameras in the  
courtroom. However, after considering Court TV’s request and the experiences of other judges  
who have permitted televised hearings, Judge Nash agreed to permit television coverage for that

1           “(xix) Any Other Factor The Judge Deems Relevant.” This Court should reject the  
2 District Attorney’s suggestion that television coverage affects the ability of the system “to work in  
3 ‘calmness and solemnity.’” (DA Brief at 10.) In fact, any concerns about the adverse impact on  
4 the proceedings or witnesses are belied by the research conducted in more than a dozen states –  
5 including Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts,  
6 Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Virginia, and Washington – that studied the  
7 potential impact of electronic media coverage on courtroom proceedings, particularly focusing on  
8 the effect cameras have upon courtroom decorum and upon witnesses, attorneys and judges.<sup>22</sup> The  
9 results from the state studies were unanimous: the claims of a negative impact from electronic

10  
11 hearing. Judge Nash later advised Court TV that the experience was better than he expected and  
12 not disruptive at all of the proceedings. Access Proponents submit that the Court’s experience in  
13 this case also has proven that television access causes no disruption of courtroom proceedings (or  
14 other adverse effect). Access Proponents urge this Court to speak with Judge Nash or others who  
15 have permitted television coverage of preliminary hearings and trials to fully evaluate the value of  
16 television coverage of such proceedings.

17           <sup>22</sup> Copies of the state studies or summaries of these studies that Access Proponents were  
18 able to obtain are included in the Appendix as follows: Arizona (untitled), which is at handwritten  
19 page 39 of the Information Service Memorandum IS 88.002, TV Cameras In the Courts, Evaluation  
20 of Experiments (“Sample Survey”), included in App. Tab G; California – Evaluation Of  
21 California’s Experiment With Extended Media Coverage Of Courts, Submitted by Ernst H. Short  
22 and Associates, Inc. (Sept. 1981), which is included in App. Tab H; see also Cameras In Court,  
23 1983 Report To The Governor And Legislature, which is included at handwritten page 106 of the  
24 Sample Survey in App. Tab G; Florida (untitled), which is at handwritten pages 3 and 62 of the  
25 Sample Survey included in App. Tab G; Louisiana – Report On Pilot Project On The Presence Of  
26 Cameras And Electronic Equipment In The Courtroom (undated), which is at handwritten page 101  
27 of the Sample Survey included in App. Tab G; Minnesota – Report Of The Minnesota Advisory  
28 Commission On Cameras In The Courtroom To The Supreme Court (Jan. 1982), which is at  
handwritten page 79 of the Sample Survey included in App. Tab G; Nevada – Final Statistical  
Report Cameras In The Courtroom In Nevada (1980), which is at handwritten page 18 of the  
Sample Survey included in App. Tab G; New York – Report Of The Chief Administrator To The  
New York State Legislature The Governor And The Chief Judge On The Effect Of Audio-Visual  
Coverage On The Conduct Of Judicial Proceedings, Matthew T. Crosson (March 1991), included in  
App. Tab I; Report Of The Committee On Audio-Visual Coverage Of Court Proceedings, Hon.  
Burton B. Roberts, Chair (May 1994), which is included in App. Tab J; and Washington – Cameras  
In the Courtroom – A Two-Year Review In The State Of Washington, A Project Of The  
Washington State Superior Court Judges’ Association Committee On Courts And Community  
(Sept. 1978), which is at handwritten page 10 of the Sample Survey, included in App. Tab G.

26           Most of these state studies, and studies from Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, New  
27 Jersey, Ohio and Virginia, are described in Electronic Media Coverage Of Courtroom Proceedings:  
28 Effects On Witnesses And Jurors, Supplement Report Of The Federal Judicial Center To The  
Judicial Conference Committee On Court Administration And Case Management (1994), which is  
included in App. Tab K.

1 media coverage of courtroom proceedings – whether civil or criminal – are baseless. Among other  
2 things, the state studies revealed that fears about witness distraction, nervousness, distortion, fear of  
3 harm, and reluctance or unwillingness to testify were unfounded.

4 California’s report on the effect of electronic coverage of court proceedings is one of the  
5 most comprehensive of the state evaluations that have been completed. The California study  
6 included observations and comparisons of proceedings that were covered by the electronic media,  
7 and proceedings that were not. (App. Tab H, at 20, 55-67, 82-98.) Not only did California’s  
8 survey results mirror those of other states – finding that there was no noticeable impact upon  
9 witnesses, judges, counsel, or courtroom decorum when cameras were present during judicial  
10 proceedings – but the state’s “observational” evaluations further buttressed these results. (*Id.* at  
11 220-227, 243-45.) For example, after systematically observing proceedings where cameras were  
12 and were not present, consultants who conducted California’s study concluded that witnesses were  
13 equally effective at communicating in both sets of circumstances. (*Id.* at 103-04.) Not surprisingly,  
14 the California Study also revealed that there was no, or only minimal, impact upon courtroom  
15 decorum from the presence of cameras. (*Id.* at 78-79.)<sup>23</sup>

16 The positive results of the state court evaluations were further bolstered by the Federal  
17 Judicial Center’s 1994 study of a three-year pilot program that permitted electronic media coverage  
18 in civil proceedings in six federal district courts and two circuit courts. (App. Tab K.) The federal  
19 study concluded that no negative impact resulted from having cameras in the courtroom. Thus, the  
20 extensive empirical evidence that has been collected on the impact of electronic coverage  
21 consistently has concluded that such coverage is not detrimental to the parties, to witnesses, to  
22 counsel, or to courtroom decorum.<sup>24</sup>

23  
24 <sup>23</sup> The overwhelmingly positive results from the California Study cannot be distinguished  
25 on the ground that the case at hand is a “high-profile” case. To the contrary, as noted in the  
26 California study, it is precisely the “sensational heinous crime case type” that constitutes a large  
portion of the proceedings that are covered by electronic media, and such cases were included in  
the State’s study. (*Id.* at 67-69.)

27 <sup>24</sup> This Court should evaluate these Rule 980 factors and enunciate the reasoning underlying  
28 its decision. *KFBM-TV Channel 9 v. Municipal Court*, 221 Cal. App. 3d 1362, 1368-699 (1990).  
As the Court of Appeal explained, “Rule 980 recognizes that media access should be granted  
except where to do so will interfere with the rights of the parties, diminish the dignity of the court,

5.  
**THE PUBLIC'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO OBSERVE CRIMINAL  
PROCEEDINGS INDEPENDENTLY JUSTIFIES AN ORDER  
GRANTING THE RULE 980 APPLICATIONS.**

Thirty-eight years ago, the United States Supreme Court reversed the criminal conviction of Billy Sol Estes by a narrow margins, in part because of the perceived prejudicial impact of the televising of Estes' trial. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). The technology used in 1965 was markedly different than the unobtrusive equipment used by Access Proponents today; at the Estes trial, there were twelve camera persons, several thick cables snaking through the courtroom, and numerous microphones, all of which caused "considerable disruption" in the courtroom. Id. at 536. Although he agreed that the intrusive nature of the equipment used in 1965 jeopardized the defendant's due process rights, Justice Harlan, the dispositive concurring vote in Estes, recognized that the day might come when "television will have become so commonplace an affair in the daily life of the average person as to dissipate all reasonable likelihood that its use in courtrooms may disparage the judicial process. If and when that day arrives the constitutional judgment called for now would of course be subject to re-examination in accordance with the traditional workings of the Due Process Clause." Id. at 595-96 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).

By 1981, technology had advanced to the point that a unanimous Supreme Court held that televising a trial – over the objections of two criminal defendants – was not a violation of their due process rights. Chandler, 449 U.S. at 576.<sup>25</sup> Chief Justice Burger's opinion emphasized that Estes had not established a rule banning states from experimenting with an "evolving technology, which, in terms or modes of mass communication, was in its relative infancy in 1964 ... , and is, even now, in a state of continuing change." Id. at 560. The unanimous Chandler opinion also observed that "the data thus far assembled was cause for some optimism about the ability of states to minimize the problems that potentially inhere in electronic coverage of trials." Id. at 576 n.11.

or impede the orderly conduct of the proceedings," and enunciating the Court's reasoning is the only way to ensure that any challenge can "be objectively analyzed." Id.

<sup>25</sup> Accord People v. Spring, 153 Cal. App. 3d 1199 (1984) (presence of television camera during trial did not violate criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial); State of New Hampshire v. Smart, 622 A.2d 1197 (N.H. 1993) (televised coverage of high-profile murder trial did not prejudice defendant); Stewart v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 427 S.E.2d 394 (Va. 1993) (presence of video cameras during criminal trial did not violate defendant's due process rights).

1 Thirty-eight years after Estes, as Justice Harlan predicted, the technological advances and  
2 commonplace reliance on television are here. Consequently, Access Proponents respectfully  
3 submit that a constitutional presumption exists in favor of allowing cameras in the courtroom.

4 **A. The Public Should Be Afforded The Most Direct Access To Matters Of Public Record.**

5 In modern society, demographics preclude the overwhelming majority of Americans from  
6 physically attending court proceedings. Id. at 572-73. Yet those societal changes do not mean that  
7 the constitutional right of access can be exercised only by the small number of citizens who  
8 actually fit into the courtroom. As one court asked, “what exists of the right of access if it extends  
9 only to those who can squeeze through the [courtroom] door?” United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d  
10 1348, 1360 (3d Cir. 1994). Here, only 42 people – 21 members of the media and 21 members of  
11 the public – will be permitted into the courtroom. (App. Tab F.) Through cameras in the  
12 courtroom, however, others have a meaningful opportunity to exercise their constitutional right to  
13 observe criminal proceedings. For that right to have meaning, the First Amendment right of access  
14 must include a presumptive right for the media to televise criminal proceedings and for the public  
15 to observe those proceedings on television. To conclude otherwise is inconsistent with the  
16 fundamental meaning of Richmond Newspapers and NBC Subsidiary.<sup>26</sup>

17 **B. Other Courts Have Recognized That The First Amendment Guarantees The Right To  
18 Observe Televised Court Proceedings.**

19 Given the increasing weight accorded the public’s right of access by the United States  
20 Supreme Court, it is not surprising that some lower courts have recognized that the First  
21 Amendment guarantees the right to observe televised court proceedings. For example, in Katzman  
22 v. Victoria’s Secret Catalogue, 923 F. Supp. 580, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), the federal district court

23  
24 <sup>26</sup> The Supreme Court and lower courts also have held that differential treatment of  
25 different media is impermissible under both the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment.  
26 See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 590 (1983)  
27 (differential tax scheme impermissible); Cable News Network, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos.,  
28 518 F. Supp. 1238, 1245 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (ordering White House to drop its exclusion of the  
electronic media from a media pool because such an exclusion “denies the public and the press  
their limited right of access, as guaranteed by the First Amendment.”) Although the United States  
Supreme Court has not yet applied these principles to the broadcast media’s ability to televise court  
proceedings, these decisions are inconsistent with restrictions on the electronic coverage, unless  
there is a compelling justification for differentiating among the different media.



1 distinguished Estes, noting that the Supreme Court in that case “explicitly recognized that its  
2 holding ultimately relied on the then-state of technology[.]” Relying on subsequent “advances in  
3 technology,” the Katzman court concluded that the old objections to cameras in the courtroom –  
4 which were the same objections that previously had been raised against the public’s right to attend  
5 trials – “should no longer stand as a bar to a presumptive First Amendment right of the press to  
6 televise ... court proceedings, and of the public to view those proceedings on television.” Id.

7 In another criminal case that generated enormous public interest, a New York state court  
8 granted Court TV’s request to televise the trial of four New York policemen charged in the  
9 shooting of unarmed African immigrant Amadou Diallo. See People v. Boss, 182 Misc. 2d 700,  
10 705 (N.Y. Supreme Ct. 2000). Echoing Katzman, the court in Boss held that there was a  
11 “presumptive First Amendment right of the press to televise court proceedings, and of the public to  
12 view those proceedings on television.” Id. (emphasis added). Over objections by the criminal  
13 defendants, the court declared – with words equally apt to this case – that televised coverage was  
14 warranted because “the denial of access to the vast majority will accomplish nothing but more  
15 divisiveness while the broadcast of the trial will further the interests of justice, enhance public  
16 understanding of the judicial system and maintain a high level of public confidence in the  
17 judiciary.” Id. at 706.<sup>27</sup> Consistent with the rulings in Katzman and Boss, Access Proponents  
18 respectfully request that this Court find a presumptive First Amendment right for the public to  
19 observe this important case on television.

20 DATED: July 31, 2003

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28 <sup>27</sup> Other New York trial courts have reached a different result; to date, there is no decision  
from the New York appellate court resolving this dispute.