Dog Trailing and Cadaver Evidence
Pre-Trial Evidentiary Hearings
March 2, 2004
Arguments, for exclusion of the evidence
GERAGOS: The Court I think cannot allow any of the dog tracking evidence in, period. There is three cases, the cases I'm sure the Court has read several times. I think that in our moving papers I went back and reread the cases myself. I think in our moving papers we have misstated. I think that we had indicated in the moving papers that two out of three cases, which were the Malgren and the Gonzales where the dog tracked to a suspect. When I went back and reread the first case, Craig, it appeared that what they did in Craig, they took the dog to the car where the car was stopped, and then they tracked, and it went to the point of detention. So that the point of detention, as the Court will remember from the factual summary in the Craig case, is where they had actually taken the purported victim or complaining witness to identify the two of the three persons. So in all three cases, what you had was a tracking that was in less than an hour after the event that led to a specific suspect. Now, if you have -- those are only three cases that -- Court of Appeal cases that said you can use this kind of evidence. In two of those cases, one of them, they threw it out all together. The last, Gonzalez, which is the most recent case. The other two cases the Court struggled mightily with even allowing that in. The Court said in a situation where, no matter how much machinations the Court went through in the one case, where the dog was in the house within 25 minutes of the burglary, and then goes through the field seven tenths of a mile later, when the guy has got some wet pants, and they find a couple other items. And the Court's going back and forth struggling with whether that should be allowed in, and then it allows it in, but subject to a jury instruction that says you have to use the utmost of care.
JUDGE: And corroboration.
GERAGOS: And corroboration. And you can't use that old saw that because they found somebody, therefore there is corroboration. Here, what do you have? We have a contaminated scene. Clearly we have got Boyer's testimony that he's moving people out of the street, news media out of the street. We have got previous testimony that on the day of the incident the police cordoned off the house, that there was a number of people that had gone in and out of the house, including the police. We know for a fact that days had elapsed. We know that we have got a complete conflict in the testimony as to the scent article. We have one woman saying that she pulled it out. We have got Boyer saying he pulled it out. There is no dispute, at least from Eloise Anderson, that when she pulled it out she used the same glove that would have been from my client. We have a dog that goes to the middle of the street and then stops. We have no testimony or no foundation whatsoever for vehicle trailing in this state. If you were to allow anything in the way relating to vehicle trailing, if you would have specifically gone beyond the three published cases, two out of those three cases talk about the fact that you can allow it in in a situation where the trail has not reached a point where somebody would have left in a vehicle, because there is no evidence that that is something that is going to be helpful to a jury. If anything, it's more prejudicial than probative. And it's -- frankly, it's complete voodoo as Mr. Harris had indicated. The idea that you are then going to allow 10 or 11 days to elapse, and you are going to have dogs alert, or not alert, or follow somewhere along the highway. In the two cases, the first two, Craig and Malgren, they had testimony, not just from the handler. They had the person who trained the handler, Mr. Outman, who testified in both cases. Mr. Outman testified that they had -- those dogs had trailed in the situation such as that a hundred percent of the time. Here we have got, at best, fifty percent, and she's done two. And she doesn't have any training records for the two months between the time that there was a failure of one, or at least a failure of memory on her part, at the seminar. And then the next thing she does is a tracking.
JUDGE: Talking about Merlin now?
GERAGOS: Right. The other cases you have got in the published cases, you have got weekly training runs. You have a trainer coming in and saying that that dog was good and that it had performed admirably. If you let this kind of evidence in, it is the worst speculation in a capital case. In fact, as I sat here and listened, it reminded me. I used to be an anthropology major in college. We used to study the Congo. There was a certain tribe that had a shaman that used to pump a divining rod. They used to track -- they used to divine the jackal tracks. That, to me, makes a lot more sense than what we heard testified to here. It was complete and utter nonsense. The vehicle trailing 11 days later that we're out at a pier. A period of time later, if the Court takes a look at the Department of Emergency Services' regulations, the cadaver -- and I think it was one of the exhibits for cadaver testing, they test with a cadaver hanging, they test with a cadaver buried, and they test in an enclosed area, interior area where there is a cadaver part. They don't test -- nobody has ever testified in any courtroom anywhere that you can have somebody trail cadaver parts. That's never been done. It's not certified by the state, yet we're going to let that come in in a death penalty case? Nobody has ever admitted, as far as I'm aware of, vehicle trailing. There isn't a single case that they can cite to where there is vehicle trailing that has been allowed in a courtroom. We're going to let that in in a capital case when we have got three specific cases? And I know that the Court in the --
JUDGE: Got them. The Craig, Malgren, and Gonzalez.
GERAGOS: Right. I don't know how the Court could let any of this in. There isn't any foundation. It is the worst type of evidence I think that the -- it would -- at some point I almost jokingly, of course, would say, well, judge, let it in, because it's reversible error per se. It would never sustain itself on appeal. But, obviously, you know my feelings about making records. The idea that the Court would allow any of this nonsense in for any reason. There is no corroboration. There is nothing that you can point to that shows that these dogs were trailing any scent whatsoever. Every point that you have got an inability of this dog to go, whether it's three miles south to the warehouse when the dog is led, and next thing you know it goes trailing the opposite way away from the warehouse where it's ending up at the Gallo Winery. There is no corroboration. It is nothing but trial by augury. I would ask the Court to exclude it. I think that it would be the worst kind of error to allow this in.
Arguments, for inclusion of the evidence
JUDGE: Mr. Harris, are you the advocate of this evidence?
HARRIS: Yes. Judge, I think first thing that has to happen is the Court has to distinguish some of the things that counsel has been arguing about, which is the question of admissibility versus the question of corroboration that the jury is instructed on. So there are two separate issues about that corroboration. The CalJIC instruction says, 2.16, that's a question for the jury after the Court makes the determination of admissibility. There is a five-step process for the determination of admissibility, if the Court follows Malgren and doesn't follow Craig. Just go through this. Craig is the oldest case. If the Court follows Craig, that particular court said the only requirement for dog testimony is that the handler is qualified and is able to testify as an expert, and that the dog meets the basic reliability, the basic establishment that the dog is able to do what it does. None of these cases, as counsel indicates, really threw this testimony out. They were looking at particular things post-verdict for different issues. If the Court follows Craig, you start moving down the line. As you get to Malgren, Malgren takes Craig, just goes one step further and says let's break it down into a five-step process for admissibility. Not talking about the corroboration requirement that the jury has to decide, because that's an issue. Can there be a conviction based solely on the dog tracking evidence? People don't dispute that. The people don't. Really that doesn't matter at this point.
JUDGE: That's a given. You can't have a conviction just based on dog tracking evidence, period.
JUDGE: That's what the cases all say. Has to be corroborated.
HARRIS: That's something we're not dealing with here. The only issue is the five-step process, which is the more stringent under Malgren. The Court has already made the finding as to the first three. The handlers are experienced to use the dog. The dog is trained to track humans. The dog has been reliable in tracking humans. The first three steps are done. The next two steps, is the dog is placed in a particular track, and, five, the trail is not stale or contaminated. So to go through these particular steps, and looking through the cases, when you start with the Craig case, this, again, was a circumstance where the facts in those particular cases kind of prove our point and not prove the defense's point. The dog was taken to a known location. The dogs were able to follow from that particular location to where the detentions occurred. This was a circumstance here where it shows that the dogs are able to identify individuals, multiple scents, follow from locations and get to a particular point. There was no other evidence other than that. Then, later on, they found some property in the vehicle that came from the earlier purse snatch in that particular case. Again Kelly-Frye was not an issue. The court said it really gets down to the expertise.
JUDGE: Kelly-Frye is not an issue in dog tracking evidence. That should be clear.
HARRIS: So then you go into the Malgren case. And this is -- really goes to point number five. Malgren is most informative about that particular case. It's also cited in the defendant's points and authorities. The case of People versus Centolella out of New York. Malgren takes the standard and is quoted on page 238, the, five-step process citing to People versus Sands, which is a case out of Michigan. And in that particular case, when they get to that last element, they talk about the trail had not become so stale or contaminated as to be beyond the dog's competency to follow it. So it's a slightly different wording. That's where Malgren comes from. There is no explanation of what stale or contaminated means in California. So we have to trace, where does that come from. If you follow People versus Sands and People versus Centolella, it cites to the case of People versus Harper. Harper cites to the original case of Centolella, which is the one that the defense has cited. And the quote from that particular case at page 463 shows that the prosecution must show that the dog or dogs were within the period of efficiency. That's all that is required under that particular component, that it's not stale, that it's not contaminated. Now, the testimony that we have in this particular case as to the trailing dogs, counsel makes a big distinction that none of these cases involve vehicle tracks or vehicle trails. They have had the opportunity to bring in their own expert to say that there is -- there is a dispute. There is nothing that's going on that it can't be done. So the uncontradicted testimony at this point in time from the three individuals involved is that there is no difference between that, other than it makes it a little bit more difficult. So we have Miss Valentin, Miss Anderson, and Mr. Boyer talking about the ability of doing this. They all testified, in Merlin's particular case, he's certified by CARDA up to 96 hours. Miss Anderson's dog was certified by CARDA up to 96 hours. So we start with what their efficiency level is. So they are certified up to 96 hours. The first track at the house, the second track at the shop, the third track from the Berkeley Marina, are all within that certified-by-the-state period of time for them to follow a trail. Miss Valentin talks about her dog has run trails up to 14 days. The trail out from 132 out to 580 is within that time period. So, again, if we follow the line of cases that ultimately is adopted by Malgren to set the standard, the dogs here have not done anything outside of their efficiency. They have not done anything outside of the area of their ability. And they were successful in following these particular trails. The defense wants to say this is voodoo, and so on, and so forth. But the circumstances are, when you look at point number four, placing the person on the particular track, in the pleadings the defense said, well, it has to be a guilty party. So, again, they are saying since there is no case that says it can be a missing person, it has to be the suspect.
JUDGE: Going to ask you that. Is the fact that we're looking for a missing person rather than a responsible person, do you think that that's a distinction without a difference?
HARRIS: I think it is, clearly so. Because, based on the testimony and the evidence presented to the Court, the dogs don't know the difference in terms of, is the person guilty or is the person innocent. They only know that they are given a particular scent, and that's what they are supposed to follow. In this particular case we think it's actually more helpful and proves more towards the admissibility of the evidence because, unlike in the Malgren case where the individual that's involved runs out the back door, and the scent that they are using is from the -- is from the pillowcase -- trying to remember which. I'm sorry, that's the Gonzalez case. In the Gonzalez case, it's two individuals in the house. A pillowcase ends up down the hallway. They scent off of the pillowcase in that particular case. They have the pillowcase. The evidence is testified to at that particular trial that it belongs to one of the residents of the house, but the dog is able to follow the scent off of that pillowcase down the track and ultimately to the person that's hiding down in the weeds.
JUDGE: Let me ask you something else. Would the fact that the tracking dogs in those cases actually came to a human being, do you see any difference between that and the situation where the dogs here could not actually find anybody?
HARRIS: I don't think it makes a legal distinction because, again, what you have is, you have the dog's ability, which is parts of one, two, and three. They have been proven reliable. So that's really what the testimony is. And it comes back to Craig, which is the expert testimony saying I'm interpreting the dog's movements and, abilities and they are on the trail. And ultimately, if you really look at this, and you put these pieces together as Captain Boyer was saying, the dog tracks away from the house using the bowling alley example, where they work the entire front of the property. They know that the dog picks up on the freshest scent. Under any theory, either the defense theory or the prosecution theory, Laci Peterson left that house. She left the house either on foot or in a vehicle. She had to cross the front of that particular house, unless the Court wants to imagine that this almost-eight-month pregnant woman jumped the back fence. The dog was started in the place where the circumstances indicate that the person was at. The dog picked up that scent and started to follow. Now, the defense makes --
JUDGE: Interrupt again. I'm going to ask you. The dog picks up the freshest scent. Is there any way of determining when Miss Peterson could have left that scent? Could it have been the 23rd, the 22nd, the 21st?
HARRIS: Again, based on either of the theories, if the Court were to accept what the defendant's statements to the police were, that she left to go to walk her dog in the park, we know when that was - - had to occur. If it's what the people's theory is, that she was driven away by the defendant, both of those occur basically at the same time within, that same time period that he says. So we have the starting period of when it occurred. The dog tracks and indicates that it's following a vehicle trail. Miss Valentin has testified that she has followed vehicle tracks before, vehicle trails, and recognizes what the dog is doing. Now, if the Court takes that as testimony that they did on the 132 track where they do a discontinuous trail, you pick them up, you move to another point. They did that later on with Merlin. They moved to the warehouse. The defense makes the big issue about the corner of Kansas and Emerald, the dog going the wrong way. But as the Court pointed out, to me, the dog was not trained to find the warehouse. The dog was finding the freshest scent, which was going away from the warehouse. When it goes to 132, that particular trail continued all the way out to 580, ultimately to the Berkeley Marina. The dog track at the Berkeley Marina then goes from one of the two entrances in the marina down to the very end of that particular ramp. And as Miss Anderson says, her dog being scented on Laci Peterson goes to the end of that boat ramp and gives her the end-of-the-trail signal. The testimony is, and the evidence before the Court is, that Laci Peterson's body was found within two miles of that particular location. If the dogs could have swam that distance, we might not be debating the question of whether the dogs had found somebody at the end of that trail. But the Court can take judicial notice of the fact of the distance from Modesto to the Bay, and that's a long way for the dogs to go. And they seemed to have made it in the right direction where Laci Peterson ultimately ended up at. So I think, under the circumstances, it's -- clearly step four and step five are met, and we're getting into the question of corroboration for the jury on their reliability, which is not one of the five prongs. If we take the defense argument that there is contamination with the glove, that is disproven by the very facts in this particular case. Both Miss Anderson, Miss Valentin, and Mr. Boyer said the one thing that would happen, if there was any of this contamination issue as to the scent item, not to the trails. Because everybody said there was no contamination as to the trails. They weren't stale, within their abilities. If the defendant had touched those items, or somebody had touched this item and then touched those items so it's the defendant's scent, the dogs would have gone to the freshest scent, and they would have gone to the defendant sitting in the house at the time that they ran this trail. And the Court has the best evidence of these dogs' ability, and refutes what the defense says about not being able to track the defendant or a person in the vehicle, is what Officer Applegate testified to on Thursday, that he's out there. He doesn't believe much in these dogs, but he says Eloise, as he described her being dragged up the him by that dog. So we have the circumstances, again, where the dog is working the trail. That particular dog was scented on the brown slipper that day. So Trimble is being pulled down the path on the defendant's trail. He comes downwind of the defendant who drives out to that location, and he turns and is going up the onramp. The dog indicates where the defendant had just been, according to the testimony of Officer Applegate. Under those circumstances, we do have corroboration of those dogs' abilities to find the particular person that they are scented for. The last step with regards to the cadaver dogs. The cadaver dogs are -- the only one, Twist, in his search at the house, the warehouse, is the only one that's operating outside of his area of efficiency or proficiency, depending on the cases or the language used from the other cases. Miss Anderson said that she initially tells the officers that it's an alert based on what the dog does. But as she steps back and looks at it, because she had never worked in that particular environment before at the warehouse, she has to say it's more of an interest. She won't say it's a full alert because of the chemical smell that's in the warehouse. Again, that's the only one that's even close to being that issue of potentially outside of the dog's ability or efficiency. So, overall, for the admissibility we have clearly the dogs' education, training, the first three prongs. The trails were not stale or contaminated within the language of the cases, because it's within their parameters of training, and that there is no issue of them being placed on the place where the person had been, because, again, assuming that -- using the people's particular theory, Miss Peterson was driven away from the house. That's what the first track shows. The defendant says he goes to the warehouse, picks up his boat. The track goes away from the warehouse again. We know she's there. They work the front of that warehouse. He goes to the marina. Miss Anderson said she works one side of the marina. She works the other side of the marina. The dog goes down to the end of the boat ramp, and scent does not return. That particular dog was scented on Miss Peterson. There was no contamination, because otherwise the dog would have come back up the ramp and out the road following the defendant home if the dog was scented on him. He gives the end-of-trail, because he could not go any further. I think, for admissibility purposes, we have met our threshold, and it's also only a probability standard that we have to meet for admission. So with that, people would submit it.
JUDGE: Do you want to respond, Mr. Geragos?
GERAGOS: Yes, I want to respond. I can't even believe I'm sitting in a courtroom in the year 2004 listening to this nonsense. We have three cases. Where does he get there is no stale or contamination? There isn't a single case that you can cite me that allows for a dog trailer to come in on 24 hours, let alone 48 hours, let alone 72 hours. There is no certification from CARDA for vehicle trailing, period. They can't point to it. There is none. This is not a dog tested for proficiency, yet she has got the dog running all over town, going right, left, and everywhere else. You have here a perfect example of how desperate this prosecution team is in trying to get this nonsense into a courtroom. There is nothing. When they say there is no stale or contamination, the very first place the dog goes to is the location where the media is encamped. And, guess what happens? It loses the scent. Guess why? Because the street has got nothing but satellite trucks and people walking out in front of it. And it's three days later. And there is no way a dog can trail anything at that point, because you have got a virtual encampment in front of the place. Then what do they do? They take the dog zigzagging through Modesto, and it ends up at the Gallo plant. His answer to that -- he has no answer to that. The dog doesn't know what it's trailing. We don't know what the dog is trailing because, as the Court's said there is no body. There is no human. There is nothing there to test it. It could I have been scenting the Cabernet. We don't know. The dog turns around and goes to the storage shed. They don't go into the storage shed. We don't know what the storage shed is. He claims that he was going ahead also towards the warehouse. He's not going anywhere. You might as well just play pin the tail on the donkey here for what we have got in a capital case. Give me one case, one single case. He goes through a genealogy that is the most tortured logic I think I have heard in recent times, where he wants you now to just ignore Craig, ignore Malgren, ignore Gonzalez, and started talking about one string cite for a case that, by the way, has nothing to do with vehicle trailing, where there was somebody who was found. The case that he cites, every single one of these cases, there is somebody who is found. It is a suspect. It is contemporaneous. It's not four days later. It's not some woman who fails with her dog one out of two times. We're going to -- let's see if we can get her to do it, is her expertise in a capital case. This Court cannot, under the existing case law, allow any of this into a capital case. Besides the corroboration, we can't even get past stale or contamination. There is nothing here. When he says if the dogs could swim, apparently he stepped out of the room when he had his witnesses testifying that there were water dogs out there. They took the water dogs out. There was nothing. So the idea that four months later they find Laci Peterson and Conner's bodies two miles away at that point. Only the deaf and dumb didn't know where they were searching and where Mr. Peterson was that day. That doesn't give you any corroboration. This whole -- this exercise is nonsense. It's utter nonsense. I would ask the Court to exclude it. There is nothing here that is admissible. There is nothing here that meets the caselaw, threshold definition. And this is the worst kind of evidence, as all of those cases cite, that the Court has to handle with great care. And to allow this in in any way, shape, or form I think is reversible, per se.
HARRIS: Just briefly in response. That particular comment by the defense that this is the worst kind of evidence, that was rejected in each of those three cases. And, in fact, when they were asked about the type of corroboration that needs to be required, they said there is no problem with dog tracking evidence like there is accomplice evidence. There is no motivation behind it. So, again, the defense always comes back to the corroboration, which is a jury issue. That has nothing to do with the admissibility. And the --
JUDGE: Well, I think the Court has to make a finding there is some corroboration before I let it go to the jury. I think under 402 I have to make that finding.
HARRIS: If the Court -- your Honor looks at corroboration, again we have -- in this particular case, we have the corroboration of these dogs' ability, based on the defendant's own actions and his own statements as to saying where he was, where his wife was, and, in fact, being seen by Officer Applegate, having him come up to him. The defense, again, makes this big issue of contamination out at the scene. But there is no contamination. That was testified to by Miss Valentin, that she was able to find the track, and the dog was able to trail it. And, again, we're only dealing with the probability, which is the standard for admissibility for this particular evidence. And I think that's clearly been met by the testimony. The corroboration is something for the jury, as CalJIC 2.16 says.
GERAGOS: Judge, the example about Applegate, because it's contemporaneous. That's the whole issue. That proves the point. The point is, is that if the dog has any skill whatsoever, it is within a contemporaneous time period. The idea that somebody drives up, the dog is fifty yards away. It's been scented on an article. That person drives up and is within fifty yards, has a conversation, and the dog goes to that location, fine. That's within 15 minutes. That fits within the caselaw. They want to admit that particular piece of evidence, that would stand, that would pass muster. None of the rest of this does. All of the rest of this, on every single point, whether it's the dog at the warehouse, so-called cadaver dog, which is not testing what CARDA certifies, whether it's the dog that loses the trail in the middle of the street where, just coincidentally, there is a media mob, whether it's the dog that runs away from the warehouse, whether it's the dog that ends at Gallo, the dog that ends at the storage warehouse, it is nothing but a sophisticated playing of games with somebody out there, and that dog doesn't know what the heck it's doing. Why that, at any point, meets a threshold 402 is beyond me, I don't see. How is that possibly probative to anything?
JUDGE: Okay. The Court is ready to make ruling. First of all, the Court's read and considered the authorities, and the Court's reviewed the evidence in this case. And I have to say that the dog tracking evidence at best is iffy. Whether or not this is a capital case, or any other kind of criminal proceeding, the Court has to be very careful in admitting certain types of evidence. All the cases that are cited had to do with tracking perpetrators, not a missing person. However, I agree with Mr. Harris, this is a distinction without a difference. But in examining the evidence in this case, there is a few problems. First of all, you can't cross examine a dog, so some of this is conjectural or speculative. First of all, the evidence, with one exception, in the Court's opinion, the evidence in Modesto, listening to the testimony, the Court finds that it's contradictory. I think some of it lacks a certain degree of certitude with respect to the testimony of the dog handlers with respect to the results of the dog tracking. And the Court finds that to be inconclusive. I'm not persuaded that any of that evidence, or any of the evidence that was presented by the dogs and by the handlers in and around Modesto can be sufficiently corroborated to let the matter go to the jury. But I said there is one exception, and I think the one exception to this. Before we get into it with specifics, in the cases that I have read, they talk bout you have to corroborate the dogs -- the evidence presented by the dog. You need something to support the accuracy of the inferences drawn from the dog tracking evidence. And that's People versus Gonzalez. The need for corroboration of dog tracking evidence is to ensure it is substantiated. Now, the only evidence that I think that really should be submitted to the jury in this case is the evidence that took place at the Berkeley Marina. And I'm going to tell you why right now. First of all, the dog Trimble here, and in reviewing my notes, and so forth, has detected scent up to six days old. Also, the dog Trimble was certified for 96 hours. And in reviewing my notes, the dog Trimble was scented by Miss Anderson on December the 28th at the Berkeley Marina. She testified that the dog's head was level, gave evidence of trail at the marina that ended at the end of the pier with the water at a pylon. So we have a scent, ostensibly the scent of Miss Peterson at the marina. This is a question now for the jury to decide; but the corroboration that the Court finds is that within months, the body of Miss Peterson and her young son were found washed up in the Bay. And the evidence is that this is two to two and a half miles from the marina. So now we have independent corroborating evidence of the dog trailing at the marina, because bodies were actually found in the water, or washed ashore within a few months, within two and a half miles from the marina. The Court's of the opinion that this evidence by Trimble that was indicated, or drawn out, or shown to have occurred at the Berkeley Marina, I think there is sufficient supporting corroborative evidence for that evidence to be admissible. With the rest of it, it's very iffy to admit it. So the Court's going to rule that the only dog tracking evidence that the Court will allow in this particular case is the dog tracking evidence by Mrs. Anderson and Trimble that took place at the Berkeley Marina on December the 28th for the reasons I stated. I think that that evidence has sufficient independent corroboration. Plus the fact that the defendant admits that he went to the marina, and that also corroborates the scent of the dog. There is -- the inference the jury can draw is that Miss Peterson somehow or other was at the marina on or about the day she disappeared. The rest of this evidence I feel, for the reasons I have given, is difficult for corroboration. I think it would be foolhardy for the judge to -- for the Court to admit that evidence inn this particular case, because it would be injecting a cancer into the record. So the Court's going to find under 352 that the evidence, with the exception of the dog tracking evidence at the Berkeley pier, would be too confusing to the jury, would require an undue consumption of time compared to its probative value. So the evidence -- all the dog tracking evidence will be excluded with the exception of the dog tracking evidence that took place at the Berkeley Marina by Trimble and Miss Anderson for the reasons I have stated. And that's the Court's ruling.
GERAGOS: Thank you, your Honor.
HARRIS: Just for clarification of counsel, the one with Officer Applegate was not corroborative?
JUDGE: That's out too. That doesn't clear up anything.
HARRIS: Is the Court including Twist, the cadaver dog, in this as well?
JUDGE: All I'm stating is Trimble, I feel comfortable with that you have independent corroboration. Like I said, you can't cross examine the dog; but without repeating the testimony, the dog, as my notes said, when Miss Anderson scented Trimble at the marina, that the dog had its head level, it gave evidence of a trail at the marina that ended at the edge of the pier at the water's edge with a pylon. And then the independent corroboration that doesn't need a big stretch is that the bodies were found months later, two miles away from that area. So, to me, I'm comfortable with letting that evidence in. And, plus the additional fact that the defendant has admitted that he was there. So all this other evidence is going to -- not going to come in. But there is no issue in this case that Mr. Peterson drove from his residence to the marina on the 24th. So I don't think letting that other evidence into the game is worthy of the gamble I would be injecting a cancer into this case that doesn't have to be there. And being cautious, whether it's a capital case or another type of case. That's the Court's ruling.
HARRIS: Thank you.