by mschulter on Sat Jul 07, 2012 10:26 pm
When I read the portions of the brief regarding the
jury selection and penalty phase issues, I was
astounding that a trial judge would be quite so crude
in ruling that a juror could be excluded for cause
simply for checking an item on a questionnaire
indicating general opposition to the death penalty!
I'd call it plain error.
A clever "hanging judge" would have permitted the
defense to question at least those jurors who
indicated that they were "opposed" but could follow
the law; and then lean toward disqualifications for
cause in close causes where a juror was arguably
"indecisive" or "ambivalent" about his/her ability to
follow the law. Concluding that a juror would
"probably" be "substantially impaired" under
_Wainwright v. Witt_ (1985), where there's some reasonable
basis for doing so, could exclude lots of jurors
tending toward life (and maybe also acquittal), and
would be hard to challenge on appeal -- especially in
federal habeas corpus proceedings, where a double
deference both to the correctness of state court
factfinding and to the trial judge's evaluation of a
juror comes into play under current law.
However, this judge read _Witt_ not merely to water
down _Witherspoon v. Illinois_ (1968), but to overrule
its whole point: that a trial judge can't simply
dismiss prospective jurors wholesale because of
general scruples or opinions against capital
punishment. The test is whether the juror could follow
state law as instructed by the court.
Under the original _Witherspoon_ decision, this was a
very strict standard: the juror had to make it
unmistakeably clear that he/she couldn't consider
returning a death verdict. _Witt_ and other decisions
of the 1980's indeed loosened things up a bit: the
test is one of whether the juror would be
"substantially impaired" in following state law, and
in cases where the juror is ambiguous or noncommital
as to her/his ability to follow the law, the trial
judge has lots of scope to find probable "impairment"
and dismiss for cause. But this judge simply carried
_Witt_ too far, and misread it in a really egregious
way.
Traditionally in California law as under _Hovey v.
Superior Court_ (1980), and more recently under
federal law as well, e.g. _Morgan v. Illinois_
(1992), there's a delicate balance. Jurors unable
fairly to consider a decision in either direction,
for life or for death, are excludable for cause.
But some leaning, even a strong one, in either
direction, is no disqualification -- as long as the
juror is willing to follow the instructions of the
court and the law of the state.
As the brief makes clear, we can appreciate the
absurdity of the error committed in this case by
imagining that a trial judge were to strike all jurors
who checked an item on the questionnaire to show that
they were in "support" of the death penalty -- since
some of them might be substantially impaired in
considering and acting upon mitigating factors which
might call for a life verdict, and thus excludable
under _Morgan v. Illinois_!
Usually these _Witherspoon_-_Witt_-_Morgan_ issues are
a bit more subtle: a juror who may be unable to
consider the death penalty for a specific type of
crime where it's available under state law (e.g. first
offense, no torture, only one victim, questionable
intent to kill by an accomplice in a felony-murder
case), or a specific type of mitigating evidence (e.g.
history of being a victim of child abuse, mental
illness or brain injury, good previous record). And
under decisions like _Uttecht v. Brown_ (2007), the
trial judge has lots of scope for discretion.
But here, to borrow a phrase from Charles L. Black, a
great attorney, we don't need to count the number of
molecules of air between the ball and the bat to know
that this judge has struck out in interpreting
_Wainwright v. Witt_.